

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM: PBSWIERS

APPROVED BY C: MNIMETZ

EUR: GSVEST

EUR/RPM: SJLEDOGAR

EUR/SE:RGWING

OSD/ISA: JVSIANA

S/S-O:TMARTIN

-----073511 171729Z /43

O P 171644Z FEB 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 042503

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRES-EES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, MPOL, GR

SUBJECT: GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO NATO

REFS: (A) STATE 32867 EXDIS, DTG 150621Z FEB 78 TO USNMR

(B) STATE 27359 EXDIS, DTG 150615Z FEB 78 TO USNMR

(C) STATE 38506 EXDIS, DTG 141827Z FEB 78

(D) USNATO 1355, DTG 091815Z FEB 78

(E) USNATO 1357, DTG 091831Z FEB 78

(F) USNATO 1399, DTG 101840Z FEB 78

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(G) ATHENS 266, STATE 8325 DTG 120355Z JAN 78 TO USNMR

(H) ATHENS 816, DTG 271006Z JAN 78

USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USNMR FOR GENERAL HAIG

1. IN RECENT EXCHANGES WITH SECRETARY VANCE (REFTELS A

AND B), GREEK PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS INFORMED US THAT HE DESIRES TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON THE RESOLUTION OF GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO BY THIS SUMMER AND REQUESTED OUR HELP IN EXPEDITING THE PROCESS. SECRETARY VANCE TOLD KARAMANLIS THAT WE WISHED TO BE OF ASSISTANCE IN THIS EFFORT AND THAT WE WERE UNDERTAKING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ISSUES TO SEE HOW WE "OULD BE HELPFUL.

2. FOLLOWING UP ON THE VANCE-KARAMANLIS EXCHANGE, DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR NIMETZ MET WITH GREEK AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRAKIS FEBRUARY 9 AND 15 FOR A GENERAL REVIEW OF GREECE-NATO RELATIONSHIPS (REFTEL C AND SEPTTEL). ON FEBRUARY 9, ALEXANDRAKIS MADE MENTION OF THE MAY 30-31 NATO SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON AS A TARGET. ON FEBRUARY 15, HE INFORMED NIMETZ OF GREEK GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT REINTEGRATION ISSUES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A PACKAGE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME THAT KARAMANLIS HAS SHOWN A NEW INTEREST IN ACCELERATING GREECE'S RETURN TO NATO, HE HAS INCREASINGLY SPOKEN IN PUBLIC OF AN INTERIM "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH NATO. AS REFTTEL D INDICATES, KARAMANLIS HAS DEFINED THIS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" TO BE (A) RETURN TO FULL NATO STATUS ONLY WHEN OTHER FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO GREECE ARE RESOLVED AND (B) AN INTERIM SECRET

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ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY GREECE WOULD COMMIT ITS MILITARY FORCES TO NATO IN CRISIS OR WARTIME, BUT RETAIN NATIONAL CONTROL OF THEM IN PEACETIME. WHILE ONLY THE IMPENDING SHAPE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEKS (REFTEL E) WILL PROVE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANCE TO THE GREEK DEMANDS, THE LATTER REQUIREMENT STRIKES US TO BE MORE AN ARRANGEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE WHICH MOST ALLIES HAVE WITHIN NATO RATHER THAN SOME SORT OF "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" APPROACHING THAT OF FRANCE WITH NATO.

4. WE AGREE, HOWEVER, WITH USNATO (REFTEL F) THAT THE PROBLEMS OF "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" SHOULD BE HANDLED BY STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN GREEK AND NATO NEEDS, BOTH AS REGARDS THE ACTUAL FACT OF GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO AND AS REGARDS THE PUBLIC FACE THAT GREECE AND NATO EACH PUT ON IT. WE UNDERSTAND KARAMANLIS' DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEED IN THIS RESPECT, AND WANT TO ASSIST HIM WITH IT.

A. AS TO THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP ITSELF, WE RECOGNIZE THAT KARAMANLIS MUST BE ABLE TO SHOW HIS PEOPLE

SOME VISIBLE MODIFICATION OF THE PRE-1974 RELATIONSHIP. MORE TO THE POINT, KARAMANLIS MUST BE ABLE, AS DEFENSE MINISTER AVEROF SUGGESTED RECENTLY (REFTEL G), TO SAY THAT GREECE RETAINS SUFFICIENT NATIONAL CONTROL OVER ITS ARMED FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST THE ALLEGED TURKISH THREAT, AND TO PREVENT TURKISH ACCESS, THROUGH NATO, TO GREEK SECURITY INFORMATION, WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST GREECE.

B. NATO, FOR ITS PART, MUST HAVE A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE (A) UNDER WHICH GREEK FORCES WILL BE READILY AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE IN WARTIME AND WILL PARTICIPATE IN PLANNING AND READINESS EXERCISES IN PEACETIME, AND (B) WHICH FALLS NOT
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TOO FAR FROM THE GENERAL PATTERN APPL,CABLE TO OTHER ALLIES (ASIDE FROM FRANCE). IT OCCURS TO US THAT NATO FORCE DESIGNATION CATEGORIES, AS WELL AS THE GREEK PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE COMMAND (REFTEL H), AMONG OTHERS, MIGHT PROVIDE POSSIBILITY FOR GREEKS TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL CONTROL -- WHILE REINTEGRATION INTO NATO WAS ESSENTIALLY ACCOMPLISHED.

C. AS TO THE PUBLIC FACE PUT ON IT, THE KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE NEW ARRANGEMENT TO THE GREEK PEOPLE AS A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP". NATO, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD BE ABLE PUBLICLY TO CHARACTERIZE THE RELATIONSHIP AS (A) MEETING THE BASIC MILITARY OBLIGATIONS TO NATO, AND (B) TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE NEEDS PARTICULAR TO GREECE JUST AS EACH MEMBER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ALLIANCE TAKES ACCOUNT OF ITS PARTICULAR NEEDS. IN ESSENCE, GREECE AND NATO WOULD AGREE TO TALK BY EACH OTHER, AND NOT PUSH EACH OTHER TO THE POINT WHERE EITHER WOULD HAVE TO DENY DIRECTLY THE PUBLICLY STATED POSITION OF THE OTHER. TO THIS END, IT WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO MINIMIZE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE PUBLIC USE OF THE EXPRESSION "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP," AND TO TRY TO STEER THEIR THINKING TOWARDS GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP "WITHIN" THE NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE AND AWAY FROM GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP "WITH" NATO.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCED MEETING BETWEEN
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KARAMANLIS AND ECEVIT AND OTHER HOPEFUL SIGNS, AND TAKING ACCOUNT AS WELL OF THE FEBRUARY 9 OEG DECISION (REFTEL E), WE BELIEVE THERE NOW EXISTS A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS TOWARD EVENTUAL GREEK REINTEGRATION. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THE TURKS MAY IN THE COMING MONTHS BE LESS DIFFICULT IN THE NATO FORUM THAN THEY HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY. ON THE GREEK SIDE, THERE SEEM TO BE INDICATIONS KARAMANLIS BELIEVES THAT HE SHOULD MOVE TO CEMENT GREEK

TIES WITH THE WEST -- BOTH NATO AND THE EC -- WHILE HE STILL HAS A SOLID PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY. WE ALSO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT SOME EUROPEAN ALLIES MAY HAVE SUGGESTED TO KARAMANLIS THE NEED FOR GREECE TO REBUILD LINKS TO NATO PARALLEL TO ITS PUSH FOR RAPID FORWARD MOVEMENT ON EC MEMBERSHIP. ON OUR SIDE, WE SEE REAL ADVANTAGES IN HELPING KARAMANLIS IMPROVE GREECE'S NATO RELATIONSHIP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AT THIS JUNCTURE.

6. WE WOULD HOPE THAT GENERAL HAIG IN COLLABORATION WITH USNATO, COULD DEVELOP A PACKAGE, WHICH WE WOULD SEE AS BUILT PRINCIPALLY AROUND THE NINE POINTS AND THE SEPARATE COMMANDS, AND WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THROUGH GENERAL DAVOS. WHILE THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED BY KARAMANLIS MUST ULTIMATELY FOCUS MORE ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAN MILITARY REALITIES, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD FULL GREEK REINTEGRATION STANDS A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF MILITARY ISSUES ARE GIVEN PRIMARY EMPHASIS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE INITIATIVE IN PROMOTING SUCH A PACKAGE SHOULD COME FROM SACEUR AND THAT GENERAL HAID, IN THAT CAPACITY, SHOULD RECEIVE A FORMAL MANDATE FROM LUNS AND THE PERMREPS.

7. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS OF ADDRESSEES AS

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SOON AS POSSIBLE ON HOW USG CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ACCELERATING PACE OF GREECE-NATO DISCUSSIONS.

8. WE HOPE TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GENERAL HAIG, DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR NIMETZ AND OSD/ISA DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SIENA AND USNATO AT NATO-SHAPE FEBRUARY 24 (SEPTEL). AT AN EARLY DATE THEREAFTER, AMBASSADOR BENNET

SHOULD INFORM SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS PRIVATELY OF OUR
PRELIMINARY VIEWS. WE WOULD WELCOME LUNS' AS WELL AS
USNATO AND SACEUR'S REACTIONS AND ADVICE WHETHER A MORE
DIRECT MANDATE TO SACEUR IS REQUIRED OR DESIRABLE.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS, RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ORGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE042503
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PBSWIERS
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780074-0269
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780239/aaaabhgg.tel
Line Count: 230
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 880108d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 STATE 32867, 78 STATE 27359, 78 STATE 38506
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3554607
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO NATO
TAGS: MPOL, GR, NATO
To: ATHENS USNATO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/880108d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014